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Abstract 
This paper presents arguments with respect to the evaluation and response to risk, placing 
an emphasis on German corporate governance. It starts by discussing opportunities and 
limitations of the audit risk approach in detecting accounting and economic risks. Hereafter 
individual responses to material risks are analyzed by considering potential shortcomings 
arising from systematic deviations from rational behavior.  
In the main part, it will be argued that German corporate governance stresses internal 
reporting duties, some of which could serve as models for future international standards on 
auditing. By internalizing the information flows regarding substantial risks, negative effects of 
publicizing this kind of information can be reduced (e.g. self-fulfilling prophecies and 
litigation risks). This also facilitates a more open communication with monitoring parties. But 
to ensure the effectiveness of such an internal control, it is essential that the reporting duties 
of the auditor and the management towards the board members are legalized and put into 
compulsory form.  
In an appendix, legislative responses to audit failures in Germany since 1870 until today 
are summarized. Legal requirements and their development regarding the statutory audit in 
general, auditor independence, the auditor’s report and the audit opinion are presented. 
 
Keywords: corporate governance; behavioral economics; accounting; disclosure; Germany; 
statutory audit; law and economics; biases and heuristics.dr 
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I. Introduction 
It is widely acknowledged that auditors play an important role in corporate governance. 
However, recent audit failures raised doubts as to whether they actually played a positive role 
in corporate governance. An unfortunate series of (suspected) audit failures started in 
Germany in the nineties of the last century and led to a massive re-regulation of both the audit 
profession and the statutory audit. In retrospect, they were small compared with the scandals 
that followed in the United States, which also led to a massive new regulation of the 
profession, namely the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. Sarbanes-Oxley not only regulates audits 
and auditors in the United States but extends to foreign companies and foreign audit 
companies, as well. 
The underlying economic events that lead to these crises and the business risks which 
endanger the existence of a corporation are universally true. They arise from entrepreneurial 
activities, changing environments and decisions taken all over the world. Therefore, it is 
widely accepted that, for instance, substantial risks which endanger the existence of a firm 
need to be identified in an early stage. What differs internationally, however, are the 
institutional mechanisms embedded in national corporate governance and market regulation to 
monitor these risks effectively and to bring about appropriate responses. As a result of 
corporate crises and audit failures, regulatory activities in both the U.S. and the EU aim to 
improve the statutory audit and corporate governance. Before further changing existing 
structures, an international assessment of arguments for and against certain elements of 
corporate governance may be of value. 
This paper presents arguments with respect to the evaluation and response to risk, placing 
an emphasis on German corporate governance. It will analyze aspects of responses to material 
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risk from an individual point of view and review connected behavioral research in accounting 
and auditing. It will be argued that German corporate governance stresses internal reporting 
duties, some of which could serve as models for future international standards on auditing. 
Internal reporting duties reduce some effects that typically arise when information is 
disseminated to markets (such as, e.g., self-fulfilling prophescies). They also facilitate a more 
open communication with monitoring parties since at least some of the heavy incentives to 
litigate which may lead corporations to use strategies of legal liability avoidance in their 
public reports (e.g., MD&A) are reduced. On the other hand, “cheap talk” reporting duties 
need to be legalized and put into compulsory form. 
 
II. Risk Types and the Statutory Audit 
A. Audit Risk and Audit Risk Approach 
The statutory audit shall detect material risks in the financial statements of a corporation, 
namely in the balance sheet, the income statement, and the accompanying notes. Material 
risks can be hidden in recognized assets and liabilities. Examples include overstatement of 
assets (e.g., real estates developed by the corporation or incorrectly capitalized costs for 
infrastructure), understatement of liabilities (e.g., provisions for compensations for damages), 
and earnings overstatement, which is certainly one of the most frequent types of error or fraud 
in accounting systems. Material risks can also arise out of underlying transactions, which 
should have been included in the balance sheet but were not as provisions for losses. As 
recent examples show, consolidation rules for special purpose entities’ in-group accounts hide 
risks even if the rules are correctly applied and the entities are not included in the 
consolidated accounts (group accounts). 
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The auditor has the duty to discover these accounting risks within the limits of the 
standards of the duty of care. Given the great number of business transactions in modern 
corporations, the audit strategy plays an important part. The auditor’s aim is to minimize audit 
risk, which means “the risk that the auditor gives an inappropriate audit opinion when the 
financial statements are materially misstated” (ISA 400.3).1 It is generally assumed that the 
risk of falsely qualifying or disclaiming the audit opinion can be neglected, since management 
has a strong incentive to correct the wrong judgment. Rather, the important audit risk is the 
possibility that the financial statements do not give a fair presentation of the corporation’s 
financial position even though the auditor has (incorrectly) given an (inappropriate) audit 
opinion. 
In order to cope with audit risks, professional practice has developed audit approaches 
that break down typical risks which have to be considered when assessing risk.2 The first risk 
is the so-called inherent risk, meaning “the susceptibility of an account balance or class of 
transactions to misstatement that could be material, individually or when aggregated with 
misstatements in other balances or classes, assuming that there were no related internal 
controls” (ISA 400.4). If internal control systems are in place, some of the inherent errors and 
misstatements will be detected and prevented. Control risk means “the risk that a 
misstatement . . . will not be prevented or detected and corrected on a timely basis by the 
accounting and internal control systems” (ISA 400.5). Both inherent risk and control risk are 
within the responsibility of management. They represent the information system risk. 
Factors that influence inherent risks include the mobility of assets, valuation methods that 
 
 1. INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION OF ACCOUNTANTS, INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS ON 
AUDITING (2003), ISA 400, § 3. 
 2. See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION OF ACCOUNTANTS, supra note 1, at ISA 400. 
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are dependent on assumptions, the general economic situation, and the technological 
development.3 Inherent risk and control risk have to be estimated by the auditor and are thus 
subject to possible cognitive biases.4 Based on his estimations, the auditor then has to 
consider the detection risk, meaning the “risk that auditor’s substantive procedures will not 
detect a misstatement that exists” (ISA 400.6). The auditor can directly influence the detection 
risk by adequately planning the audit strategy and increasing the audit efforts. 
More formally, audit risk is defined as: 
 
(1) AR = IR × CR × DR  
 
where AR denotes the audit risk of a certain audit field, IR the inherent risk, CR the control 
risk, and DR the detection risk. 
Suppose that the auditor estimates the risk of material misstatements in an audit field, 
assuming that there are no internal control mechanisms, to be 50% and the control risk to be 
50%. If the auditor wants to have a level of assurance of 95% in the audit field (which is equal 
to an acceptable audit risk of 5%) the detection risk can be determined by solving equation (1) 
for DR as follows: 
 
(2) DR = AR / (IR × CR) = 0.05 / (0.5 × 0.5) = 20% 
 
 
 3. See Wolfgang Ballwieser, Was leistet der risikoorientierte Prüfungsansatz?, in 
FESTSCHRIFT GÜNTER SIEBEN 359-74 (M. Matschke & T. Schildbach eds., 1998); EVA-MARIE 
STIBI, PRÜFUNGSRISIKOMODELL UND RISIKOORIENTIERTE ABSCHLUSSPRÜFUNG 65 (1995); 
REINER QUICK, DIE RISIKEN DER JAHRESABSCHLUSSPRÜFUNG 35 (1996). 
 4. See infra note 13. 
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The acceptable level of detection risk is thus 20%. It will certainly be difficult to quantify 
the probabilities in practice. But formula (2) shows the relationship between the different 
risks. If the auditor evaluates the internal control procedures to be ineffective (setting CR = 
1.0) and still wants to hold the acceptable level of audit risk at 5%, he has to intensify the 
audit efforts, thereby reducing the detection risk: 
 
(3) DR = AR / (IR × CR) = 0.05 / (0.5 × 1.0) = 10% 
 
Alternatively, a prudent auditor may want to raise the expected inherent risk to 100%, 
which evidently leads, ceteris paribus, to a 5% acceptable level of detection risk. 
Some objections to the model may be taken into account by modifying the model. One 
criticism, for instance, is that the model assumes the same weight for all types of risk. 
Technically, the model can be extended by weight-factors that would lead to the following 
equation:5 
 
(4) AR = IRx × CRy × DRz with x, y, z ≥ 0 
 
Other shortcomings of the model are more fundamental. It can be formally shown, for 
example, that equation (1) typically leads to an underestimation of the audit risk.6 The reason 
is that the assumption that detected misstatements are actually corrected by internal control 
 
 5. Ballwieser, supra note 3, at 367. 
 6. Id. at 369. 
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mechanisms and the audit procedures is not necessarily true.7 
 
B. Economic Risk and Limitations of the Statutory Audit 
From a financial perspective the value of a firm is a function of capitalized expected 
future cash-flows.8 Therefore, the economic risk can be defined as the risk that future events 
will lead to a variance of the value of the firm, namely the market value of equity.  
The detection of all relevant economic risks certainly is beyond the scope of the statutory 
audit.9 Even if auditors plan audit strategies, estimating industry risks and focusing on future 
events and resulting influences for corporations’ financial positions and earnings, the analyses 
cannot encompass all significant risks.10 
 
III. Individual Responses to Risk 
A. Cognitive Biases and Behavioral Law and Economics 
The standard economic model of human decision-making is based on strong assumptions. 
In the classical form, economic man maximizes the subjective expected utility of (uncertain) 
 
 7. For problems in the estimation of inherent risks, see Robert Bloomfield, Strategic 
Dependence and Inherent Risk Assessments, 70 ACC. REV. 71 (1995). 
 8. See ADOLF MOXTER, GRUNDSÄTZE ORDNUNGSMÄßIGER UNTERNEHMENSBEWERTUNG 75 
(2d ed. 1983); THOMAS E. COPELAND ET AL., VALUATION: MEASURING AND MANAGING THE 
VALUE OF COMPANIES (3d ed. 2000). 
 9. See, e.g., Jens Wüstemann, Mängel bei der Abschlußprüfung: Tatsachenberichte und 
Analysen aus betriebswirtschaftlicher Sicht, in DER WIRTSCHAFTSPRÜFER ALS ELEMENT DER 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 19-43 (Marcus Lutter ed., 2001). 
 10. For applications, see, e.g., Aasmund Eilifsen et al., Application of the Business Risk 
Audit Model: A Field Study, 15 ACCT. HORIZONS 193 (2001) (describing the changes made 
recently to the audit process and their practical impact). 
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payoffs.11 Early critics to this normative model of decision-making included Allais, Simon, 
and, Ellsberg.12 Since the seminal works of Kahneman and Tversky, behavioral decision 
science showed that intuitive decision behavior differed systematically from standard utility 
theories.13 Effects that were identified include biases in the assessment of probabilities,14 
framing,15 and reference points.16 
Insights of behavioral research were successfully applied to legal issues and shaped the 
law and economics movement.17 Behavioral law and economics was criticized, stressing both 
 
 11. See JOHN VON NEUMANN & OSKAR MORGENSTERN, THEORY OF GAMES AND ECONOMIC 
BEHAVIOR 8 (3d ed. 1953). 
 12. See Maurice Allais, Le Comportement de l’Homme Rationel Devant le Risque: Critique 
des Postulats et Axiomes de l’École Américaine, 21 ECONOMETRICA 503 (page number) 
(1953); Herbert A. Simon, A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice, 69 Q.J. ECON. 99 (page 
number) (1955); Daniel Ellsberg, Risk Ambiguity and the Savage Axioms, 75 Q.J. ECON. 643 
(page number) (1961). 
 13. See, e.g., Hillel J. Einhorn & Robin M. Hogarth, Behavioral Decision Theory: 
Processes of Judgment and Choice, 32 ANN. REV. PSYCH. 53 (1981); Eldar Shafir & Robyn 
A. LeBoeuf, Rationality, 53 ANN. REV. PSYCH. 491 (2002); KEITH E. STANOVICH, WHO IS 
RATIONAL? STUDIES OF INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN REASONING 1 (1999); FRANZ EISENFÜHR 
& MARTIN WEBER, RATIONALES ENTSCHEIDEN 357 (4th ed. 2003). 
 14. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Extensional Versus Intuitive Reasoning: The 
Conjunction Fallacy in Probability Judgment, 90 PSYCH. REV. 293 (1983). 
 15. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology 
of Choice, 211 SCI. 453 (1981). 
 16. See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision 
Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979). 
 17. See Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. 
REV. 1471 (1998); Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: 
Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051 
(2000); Donald C. Langevoort, Behavioral Theories of Judgement and Decision Making in 
Legal Scholarship: A Literature Review, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1499 (1998); Donald C. 
Langevoort, Theories, Assumptions, and Securities Regulation: Market Efficiency Revisited, 
140 U. PA. L. REV. 851 (1992); Robert Prentice, Whither Securities Regulation? Some 
Behavioral Observations Regarding Proposals for its Future, 51 DUKE L.J. 1397 (2002); 
Matthew Rabin, A Perspective on Psychology and Economics, 46 EUR. ECON. REV. 657 
(2002); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The “New” Law and Psychology: A Reply to Critics, Skeptics, 
and Cautious Supporters, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 739 (2000); Cass R. Sunstein, Behavioral 
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positive and normative aspects.18 Some critical comments led to conciliation between the 
movements, although important differences still remain concerning both methodological 
questions and normative matters.19 
An important field of application lies within issues of corporate governance.20 Especially 
with regard to substantial risks that might endanger the existence of a corporation, behavioral 
research results are of importance. Overconfidence and existence of loss frames are obstacles 
 
Analysis of Law, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 (1997); Cass R. Sunstein et al., Assessing Punitive 
Damages (with notes on cognition and valuation in law), 107 YALE L.J. 2071 (1998). 
 18. See Robert A. Hillman, The Limits of Behavioral Decision Theory in Legal Analysis: 
The Case of Liquidated Damages, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 717 (2000); Samuel Issacharoff, Can 
There Be a Behavioral Law and Economics?, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1729 (1998); Gregory 
Mitchell, Why Law and Economics’ Perfect Rationality Should Not Be Traded for Behavioral 
Law and Economics Equal Incompetence, 91 GEO L.J. 67 (2002); Gregory Mitchell, Taking 
Behavioralism Too Seriously? The Unwarranted Pessimism of the New Behavioural Analysis 
of Law, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1907 (2002); Richard A. Posner, Rational Choice, 
Behavioral Economics, and the Law, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1551 (1998). 
 19. See Jennifer Arlen, The Future of Behavioral Economic Analysis of Law, 51 VAND. L. 
REV. 1765 (1998); Jennifer Arlen et al., Endowment Effects Within Corporate Agency 
Relationships, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (2002); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Mandatory Disclosure: A 
Behavioral Analysis, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 1023 (2000); Daniel A. Farber, Toward a New Legal 
Realism, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 279 (2001); Mark Kelman, Behavioral Economics as Part of a 
Rhetorical Duet: A Response to Jolls, Sunstein and Thaler, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1551 (1998); 
Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The Uncertain Psychological Case for Paternalism, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 
1165 (2003); Tanina Rostain, Educating Homo Economicus: Cautionary Notes on the New 
Behavioral Law and Economics Movement, 34 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 973 (2000); Thomas S. 
Ulen, The Growing Pains of Behavioral Law and Economics, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1747 (1998). 
 20. For a general discussion of corporate behavior and governance, see Stephen M. 
Bainbridge, Why a Board? Group Decisionmaking in Corporate Governance, 55 VAND. L. 
REV. 1 (2002); John C. Coffee, Jr., Beyond the Shut-Eyed Sentry: Towards a Theoretical View 
of Corporate Misconduct and an Effective Legal Response, 63 VA. L. REV. 1099 (1977); 
James D. Cox & Harvey Munsinger, Bias in the Boardroom: Psychological Foundations and 
Legal Implications of Corporate Cohesion, 48 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 83 (1985); Kent 
Greenfield, Using Behavioral Economics to Show the Power and Efficiency of Corporate Law 
as Regulatory Tool, 35 U.C. DAVIS. L. REV. 581 (2002); Donald C. Langevoort, The Human 
Nature of Corporate Boards: Law, Norms, and the Unintended Consequences of 
Independence and Accountability, 89 GEO. L. J. 797 (2001); Donald C. Langevoort, 
Organized Illusions: A Behavioral Theory of Why Corporations Mislead Stock Market 
Investors (and Cause Other Social Harms), 146 U. PA. L. REV. 101 (1997). 
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for effectively managing corporate crises. Biases in the estimation of probabilities will lead to 
inappropriate decision models. 
 
B. Behavioral Accounting Research 
Behavioral decision sciences also influenced accounting research. The behavioral 
accounting approach focuses on the information processing aspects of accounting. If 
accounting information shall influence actions, then behavioral aspects of actual decision-
making have to be taken into consideration. This can help to better explain and predict 
behavior of decision-makers, which is useful for both normative and positive considerations. 
The American Accounting Association’s Committee on Behavioral Science Content of the 
Accounting Curriculum systemized behavioral science to accounting issues. It stated that “the 
objective of behavioral science is to explain and predict human behavior.”21 It identified 
different areas which could be included in the accounting curriculum such as perception, 
motivation, anxiety, conflict, and attitude. Behavioral accounting research deepened the 
understanding for, e.g., biases in the perception and evaluation of risk, aspects of memorizing 
important contents, and positive aspect of standards setting.22 Riahi-Belkaoui summarizes the 
 
 21. Report of the Committee on Behavioral Science, Content of the Accounting 
Curriculum, 46 ACC. REV., Suppl. 247, 248 (1971). See AHMED RIAHI-BELKAOUI, 
ACCOUNTING THEORY 302 (4th ed. 2000). 
 22. See ROBERT H. ASHTON, HUMAN INFORMATION PROCESSING IN ACCOUNTING (1982); 
AHMED BELKAOUI, BEHAVIORAL ACCOUNTING 19 (1989); Jacob G. Birnberg & Michael D. 
Shields, The Role of Attention and Memory in Accounting Decisions, 9 ACCT. ORGS. & SOC’Y 
365 (1984); Thomas R. Dyckman, The Ascendancy of the Behavioral Paradigm in 
Accounting: The Last 20 Years, 10 BEHAV. RES. ACCT. Supp. 1 (1998); ROBERT LIBBY, 
ACCOUNTING AND HUMAN INFORMATION PROCESSING: THEORY AND APPLICATION (1981); 
Robert Libby et al., Experimental Research in Financial Accounting, 27 ACCT. ORGS. & 
SOC’Y 775 (2002); Laureen A. Maines, Judgment and Decision-Making Research in 
Financial Accounting: A Review and Analysis, in JUDGMENT AND DECISION-MAKING 
RESEARCH IN ACCOUNTING AND AUDITING (Robert H. Ashton & Alison H. Ashton eds., 
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research work, stating that the “results indicated that alternative accounting techniques may 
influence individual decisions, and that the extent of the influence may depend on the nature 
of task, the characteristics of the users and the nature of the experimental environment.”23 
 
IV. Institutional Responses to Risk in German Corporate Governance 
A. Insider and Outsider Control in German Corporate Governance 
German corporate governance has often been labeled as a governance system of “insider” 
control.24 In a certain analytic framework of international corporate governance regimes, 
insider systems have specific characteristics. The financing of corporations is less dependent 
on capital markets; instead, corporations have close relationships with financial 
intermediaries, especially with house banks (Hausbanken). Long term financing (relationship 
lending) plays an important role that makes reputational effects of borrowers and lenders 
important. In addition, ownership is concentrated on both the side of equity capital and of debt 
capital. Other marking elements include crossholdings and concentration of ownership in the 
 
1995). 
 23. AHMED RIAHI-BELKAOUI, supra note 21, at 304. See also Michael Meyer & John T. 
Rigsby, A Descriptive Analysis of the Content and Contributions of Behavioral Research in 
Accounting 1989-1998, 13 BEHAV. RES. ACC. 253 (2001). 
 24. See J. FRANKS & C. MAYER, CORPORATE CONTROL: A COMPARISON OF INSIDER AND 
OUTSIDER SYSTEMS (Working Paper, London Business School, 1994); Erik Berglöf, A Note 
on the Typology of Financial Systems, in COMPARATIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ESSAYS 
AND MATERIALS 151-64 (Klaus J. Hopt & Eddy Wymeersch eds., 1997); Reinhard H. Schmidt 
& Marcel Tyrell, Financial Systems, Corporate Finance and Corporate Governance, 5 EUR. 
FIN. MGMT. 331 (1997); Raghuram Rajan & Luigi Zingales, Financial Dependence and 
Growth, 88 AM. ECON. REV. 559 (1998); F. ALLEN & D. GALE, COMPARING FINANCIAL 
SYSTEMS 36 (2000); Christian Leuz & Jens Wüstemann, The Role of Accounting in the 
German Financial System, in THE GERMAN FINANCIAL SYSTEM 447-78 (Jan P. Krahnen & 
Reinhard H. Schmidt eds., 2003); Jens Wüstemann, Disclosure Regimes and Corporate 
Governance, 159 J. INSTITUT. TH. ECON. 717 (2003). 
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hands of banks, insurances, and—mostly for historical reasons—families.25 
These financing patterns have historically produced a complementary set of control rights 
and information rights: in the insider model a (small) group of persons, which is usually better 
informed than outside parties, exercizes important control of management. The informational 
advantage of some shareholders led to the notion of “informed capital.”26 The insider system 
is sometimes linked with elements of co-determination. In Germany, for instance, the 
Aufsichtsrat (supervisory board) of large corporations includes not only members sent by 
shareholders but also members sent by the employees of the firm. Obviously, an efficient 
functioning of mechanisms of insider control rests heavily on an appropriate distribution of 
control rights and, as a necessary prerequisite of informed decisions, corresponding 
information rights. Monitoring bodies like the supervisory board must be well informed about 
management’s actions and underlying motives and about the risks and prospects of the firm. 
Leuz and Wüstemann have collected selected institutional details, analytical arguments, and 
empirical evidence for Germany that show a system that efficiently disseminates value-
relevant information to monitoring parties within the firm.27 
 
B. Auditor’s Internal Reporting Duties and Gatekeeper Function 
As indicated, German corporate governance emphasizes internal information flows. The 
development of auditors’ internal reporting duties (as summarized in Table C in the appendix) 
gives corresponding institutional evidence. It shows that the auditor has oral and written 
 
 25. See ALLEN & GALE, supra note 24; S. Prigge, A Survey of Corporate Governance, in 
COMPARATIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 943-1044 (K. J. Hopt et al. eds., 1998). 
 26. Jean Tirole, Corporate Governance, 69 ECONOMETRICA 1, 8 (2001). 
 27. See Leuz & Wüstemann, supra note 24. 
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reporting duties toward the key monitoring party of management, namely the supervisory 
board, as a means to support it in his obligatory supervision. 
The most important reporting duty affects corporate crises. Since a decision of the 
German Federal Supreme Court of Justice in 1954, the auditor must inform management and 
supervisory board about facts that endanger the existence of the enterprise being audited or 
that could hinder its development.28 From a behavioral perspective, this makes sense, 
especially with regard to the reporting duties towards the supervisory board. Painter 
convincingly argues that due to the mentioned cognitive biases (e.g., loss frames) managers 
will tend to take higher risks than desired, particularly in situations of financial distress.29 
Therefore, he points out, responsibility should be shifted to those agents who are less affected 
by these biases.30 German corporate governance puts this into practice. 
Beside these duties, the long form auditor’s report serves as the basic means to satisfy the 
internal reporting duties. The long form auditor’s report, which is not known in the U.S., 
serves only internal purposes. Even shareholders at the general meeting typically do not have 
the right to have an insight into this report. In the first part of the report, the auditor has to 
comment on the present financial situation of the corporation and especially to evaluate the 
continuity perspectives and risks that may endanger the existence (§ 321 I HGB). In its main 
part, the auditor has to state whether bookkeeping, financial statements, management reports, 
and other audited documents comply with legal rules and regulations. Since the amendments 
of 2002, the auditor also has to inform about underlying material assumptions concerning the 
 
 28.  See Decision of the German Federal Supreme Court of Justice on 15 December 1954 (II 
ZR 322/53, 8 Wpg 138 (1995). 
 29. See RICHARD PAINTER, JURISDICTIONAL COMPETITION, CONVERGENCE, AND THE 
AUDITORS IN THE U.S. AND EU (Working Paper, University of Illinois). 
  30 See Id. 
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valuation of assets and liabilities. He has to show the effects of different assumptions on the 
financial position and the effects of accounting policies (§ 321 II HGB). Important fields of 
application include, e.g., sale-and-lease-back transactions. If the audited corporation is 
publicly quoted, the auditor has to evaluate the internal control system, in particular with 
regard to early warning systems. The respective duty to evaluate is accompanied by reporting 
duties in the auditor’s report (§ 321 IV HGB). 
It is the underlying idea of the extensive internal reporting duties to support the 
supervisory board in its supervision by giving a (written) detailed evaluation of the financial 
statements. Therefore, the legislature made clear that the contents of the auditor’s report have 
to be presented in a problem-oriented way and that plain language is employed, which enables 
members of the supervisory committee to understand the important facts even though they are 
technically less skilled than accounting experts. Necessarily, the auditor’s report exceeds the 
view of the financial health of a corporation given by public financial statements. It is some 
sort of private information which is disseminated via private information channels.31 
 
C. Auditor’s External Reporting Duties and Gatekeeper Function 
The only information given by the auditor that is passed to third parties (e.g., the capital 
markets) is the (internationally comparable) auditor’s audit opinion. In all other matters, the 
legal information rights the auditor has are accompanied by duties of confidentiality. By 
giving the audit opinion, the auditor states to third parties that, within the limits of his duty of 
care, the financial statements give a fair presentation of the firm’s position. Whereas the 
former audit opinion had a boilerplate formulation, the audit opinion now has an 
 
 31. See Leuz & Wüstemann, supra note 24. 
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individualized form in which the auditor has to declare whether the financial statements give a 
fair presentation of the corporation’s financial position and profit situation (§ 322 I HGB). 
Again, the explanations given must be comprehensible and risk-oriented (§ 322 II HGB). 
Risks which endanger the existence have to be specified and explained separately (§ 322 II 
HGB). In case the auditor qualifies or disclaims the audit opinion, reasons and details have to 
be explained. 
 
V. Discussion and Comparisons 
A. First Dilemma: Whistle-Blowing or Death Bell-Ringing? 
An early discovery of substantial risks which endanger the existence of the company is 
essential to effective corporate governance. From a human information processing perspective 
this is even more so because, as indicated above, agents may be subject to systematic 
misperceptions of and resulting inappropriate reactions to risk. Therefore, as outlined, 
German auditors have important internal gatekeeper functions.32 German Legislator has made 
it also very clear that substantial risks which endanger the existence of the company have to 
be disclosed by the corporation and discussed by the auditor in his report.33 
However, a certain dilemma lies in the fact that an early public disclosure of possible 
material risks as, e.g., an impending insolvency can also become a self-fulfilling prophecy: 
Figuratively speaking, the whistle-blowing function of an auditor and his ringing of the alarm 
bell can thus unintentionally become a death bell-ringing for the corporation. Efforts from 
banks and management to jointly work on finance agreements in order to overcome temporary 
 
 32. See also infra, Table C of the Appendix. 
 33.  See § 289 I and § 321 I HGB. 
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liquidity problems can be impeded by hasty reactions of the stock markets to public 
disclosures of solvency problems. Public disclosure in these cases is contrary to the interest of 
the corporation; it can, however, be in the interest of (some) shareholders. In a financial 
system based on the above mentioned Hausbanken which serve important liquidity insurance 
functions for a corporation this is even more so. Therefore, case studies for Germany show 
that liquidity problems were in the past sometimes kept secret to the public in order to avoid 
the logic of a self-fulfilling prophecy.34 The normative issue as to whether public disclosure in 
cases of possible substantial risks should be enforced by securities regulation nevertheless still 
remains. 
 
B. Second Dilemma: Decision-Usefulness or Avoidance of Legal Liabilities? 
A second dilemma is closely related to the above mentioned disclosure problems, namely 
the problem of a somehow unfortunate interaction of the duty to disclose decision-relevant 
substantial risks and the risks of resulting shareholder litigations. Internationally, securities 
regulations require public corporations to disclose material risks, as it is promulgated for the 
U.S. in several rules (e.g., rule 30535, rule 50336 of regulation S-K and in the MD&A37) and 
for Germany in the comparable Lagebericht which is codified in § 289 and § 315 of the 
German Commercial Code. These rules oblige corporations to identify potential risk factors 
which may affect the company’s financial position and to disclose them to the public. In the 
U.S., some of these forward-looking information are subject to safe harbor rules which limit 
 
 34.  See Wüstemann, supra note 9 at 32.. 
 35.  See rule 305 of the regulation S-K (17 C.F.R. § 229.305).  
 36.  See rule 503(c) of the regulation S-K (17 C.F.R. § 229.503(c)). 
 37.  See rule 303 of the regulation S-K (17 C.F.R. § 229.303). 
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legal liability, some of them are not.38  
From a financial perspective, these information are of course extremely decision-useful. 
However, evidence shows that disclosure of substantial business risks is at the moment rather 
driven by strategies of avoidance of legal liabilities. This is due to the fact that ex post (after a 
negative performance of the corporation or in a critical financial position) some risks that ex 
ante did not seem to have been material may prove to be decisive. This gives great incentives 
for shareholders to sue the corporation on the grounds of misleading statements.39 In order not 
to “forget” any risks, corporations thus tend to give a catalogue of all possible industry and 
business risks. Anecdotal evidence shows, that this is particularly true in risk-exposed 
industries such as the high-tech industry. For investors, however, it would probably be better 
if corporations focused on a detailed analysis of the most important business risks. 
 
C. Legalization of Internal Information Flows 
As I argued above, effective corporate governance is not only a question of public 
disclosure but also of internal dissemination of decision-relevant information to monitoring 
parties. This is especially true within a system of insider control, as the German corporate 
governance system. But it also proves to be more and more important in outsider control 
systems: Elements of “insider control” have thus been strengthened in the U.S. in the 
 
 38.  See, e.g., JANE CALDERON & RACHEL KOWAL, Safe harbors: Historical and current 
approaches to future forecasting, 22 J. CORP. L. 661 (1997); Gregory R. Roussel, Securities 
fraud or mere puffery: refinement of the corporate puffery defense, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1049 
(1998); Suzanne J. Romajas, The duty to disclose forward-looking information: a look at the 
future of MD&A, 61 FORDHAM L. REV., 245 (1993).  
 39.  See rule 10b-5 (17 C.F.R. § 240.10(b)-5) and rhule 14a-9 (17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9); see. 
e.g., LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION (4th ed. 
2001). 
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aftermath of Sarbanes-Oxley, as, e.g., the requirement to establish independent audit 
committees40 and their regular discussions with the auditors.41  
One solution to at least some of the above mentioned dilemmas and to the problems of 
internal reporting duties may lie in a more compulsory form of the internal information flows 
between the “gatekeepers” and the relevant monitoring parties. In my opinion, the above 
sketched German auditor’s report may here lead in the right direction: It forces auditors to 
analyze in depth the firm’s financial position and performance and to explicitly express 
opinions on all important accounting issues. Since it remains subject to duties of secrecy it 
avoids the risk of becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy and it will be less driven by legal 
liability avoidance strategies.42 In any case, to avoid “cheap talk” problems, internal reporting 
duties will have to be legalized. 
 
D. Audit Regulation in the Light of Behavioral Economics 
Behavioral research and the individual information processing perspective provide useful 
insights in the field of auditing and audit regulation as well. Auditors’ judgments, the role of 
knowledge and memory in judgments and the existences of biases and heuristics in decision 
making processes have been on the agenda of behavioral auditing research literature with 
 
 40.  See Section 301 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act; SEC Proposed Rule: Standards Relating To 
Listed Company Audit Committees (Release Nos. 34-47137; 33-8173; IC-25885; File No.: 
S7-02-03; January 8, 2003) at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/34-47137.htm.  
 41. See Section 204 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act; SEC Finale Rule: Strengthening the 
Commission's Requirements Regarding Auditor Independence (Release Nos. 33-8183, 34-
47265, 35-27642, IC-25915, IA-2103, FR-68; File No.: S7-49-02; Jan. 28, 2003) at 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8183.htm. 
 42.  See infra, Table C of the Appendix and supra, part IV.B. 
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important results.43 Some limitations were however also addressed:44 Shanteau for example 
emphasized as early as 1989 with respect to the cognitive heuristics and biases approach that 
there “is still not a general theory or even specific models of underlying processes”45 and he 
questioned as to whether the “biases observed with naïve subjects also apply to experts” as 
auditors.46 In a somewhat trenchant way one could say that despite the research done so far 
the line that separates rational behavior of the von Neumann-Morgenstern type from behavior 
that systematically deviates from it is still too fuzzy.  
As a consequence, the impacts of behavioral research on normative issues that go beyond 
reasoning of the grounds of common sense are probably still very limited. One major 
contribution of behavioral research however is, as Lenz formulates, to have discussed the 
 
 43.  See, e.g., Alison H. Ashton & Robert H. Ashton, Sequential Belief Revision in Auditing, 
63 Acct. Rev. 623 (1988); Thomas A. Buchman, Philip E. Tetlock & Ronald O. Reed, 
Accountability and auditors’ judgment about contingent events, 23 J. Bus. Fin. & Acct. 379 
(1996); Sarah E. Bonner, Bary L. Lewis & Garry Marchant, Determinants of Auditor 
Expertise, 28 J. Acct. Res. Supplement 1 (1990); Jeffrey Cohen & Thomas Kida, The Impact 
of Analytical Review Results, Internal Control Reliability, and Experience on Auditors’ Use of 
Analytical Review, 27 J. Acct. Res. 263 (1989); Robert Libby, The role of knowledge and 
memory in audit judgment, in JUDGMENT AND DECISION-MAKING RESEARCH IN ACCOUNTING AND 
AUDITING, (Robert H. Ashton & Alison H. Ashton eds., 1995); William F. Messier, Jr., 
Research in and development of audit-decision aids, in JUDGMENT AND DECISION-MAKING RESEARCH 
IN ACCOUNTING AND AUDITING, (Robert H. Ashton & Alison H. Ashton eds., 1995); Don A. 
Moore, George Loewenstein, Lloyd Tanlu & Max H. Bazerman, Auditor Independence, 
Conflict of Interest, and the Unconscious Intrusion of Bias, (working paper 2003), at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=324261 (Social Science Research Network); Robert A. 
Prentice, The Case of the Irrational Auditor: A Behavioral Insight into Securities Fraud 
Litigation, 95 Nw. U. L. Rev. 133 (2000); James F. Smith & Thomas Kida, Heuristics and 
Biases: Expertise and Task Realism in Auditing, 109 Psychol. Bull. 472 (1991); Ira Solomon 
& Michael D. Shields, Judgment and decision-making research in auditing, in JUDGMENT AND 
DECISION-MAKING RESEARCH IN ACCOUNTING AND AUDITING, (Robert H. Ashton & Alison H. Ashton 
eds., 1995). 
 44.  See James Shanteau, Cognitive heuristics and biases in behavioral auditing: Review, 
Comments and Observations, in 14 Acct, Orgn, and Soc. 165 (1989), 
 45.  Id. at 171. 
 46.  Id. at 172 
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right categories and to have raised the right questions.47 With regard to German research done 
so far, Lenz in his critical appraisal also points out the lack of empirical studies in Germany 
that tackle the problem of theoretical approaches in detail.48 
From a positive point of view the existing rules in the field of auditing can nevertheless be 
interpreted as a reaction to supposed biases of auditors: Rules that enforce independence of 
auditors, for example, can be explained as institutional solutions in order to avoid typical 
cognitive biases. Behavioral economics can also be applied to regulatory institutions 
themselves as, e.g., the SEC.49 But, again, limitations of the approach remain: Choi and 
Pritchard conclude their analysis stating that “insights of behavioral law and economics are 
limited by the lack of a general theory to explain why human mind results in behavioral biases 
in decisionmaking. Without such a theory, assessing possible methods for ameliorating such 
biases is a murky at best”.50 
 
VI. Conclusion 
In this paper I presented a set of arguments with respect to the evaluation and response to 
risk in international accounting and audit regimes. I argued that different types of risks exist, 
some of which can be directly addressed by auditors. The existence of persons that exercise 
gatekeeper functions is even more important because of possible misperception of and 
 
 47.  See Hansrudi Lenz, Prüfungstheorie, verhaltensorientierter Ansatz, in 
HANDWÖRTERBUCH DER RECHNUNGSLEGUNG UND PRÜFUNG (EDS. WOLFGANG BALLWIESER 
ET AL. 2002; 3RD EDITION), P. 1426-1438. 
 48.  Id. at 1935. 
 49.  See Stephan J. Choi & A. C. Pritchard, Behavioral Economics and the SEC, (working 
paper 2003), at http://www.law.umich.edu/centersandprograms/olin/papers.htm. 
 50.  Id. at 85. 
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problematic reactions to risk by management, as behavioral decision science convincingly 
shows. International systems of corporate governance and securities regulation differ in the 
way they cope with these risks. In this article, institutional responses with regard to risk are 
shown with an accentuation on internal and external reporting duties of auditors in Germany. 
Revealed differences to the U.S. system of corporate governance and market regulation can be 
explained by the different financial systems in which they are embedded.  
It is an underlying idea of the argumentation throughout the article that both the market 
based-system of corporate governance and the insider system have shown severe 
shortcomings in the past.51 Therefore, one might want to adopt such regulations from each 
system which are successfully tried and tested. One example for an instrument from an insider 
system that may serve as a model can be the auditor’s report. Especially in the field of 
evaluation and response to risk in corporate governance regimes, comparative institutional 
assessment seems to be a fruitful approach for the future.  
 
 51.  See, e.g., Wüstemann, supra note 24 at 724. 
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Appendix: Legislative Responses to Audit Failures in Germany (1870-2003) 
The following tables summarize important legislative measures in Germany from 1870 
until today. Most of the Reform Acts were reactions to audit failures.52 The Companies 
Reform Act of 1870 required the supervisory board to examine the annual accounts. It passed 
parliament during the Gründerzeit (period of promoterism), a period in the last third of the 
19th century after the German unification when many firms were established in Germany. In 
the crises which followed, when some newly founded enterprises failed and capital markets 
suffered from speculations (Gründerzeitkrise), further important measures were taken. A 
second period of intensive regulation followed in the aftermath of the world economic crises 
of 1929. Notorious bankruptcies in Germany, e.g., Nordwolle and Danat-Bank, led to 
statutory audits for corporations. The Reform of the Companies Act in the sixties 
(Aktienrechtsreform 1965) codified important changes but was possibly a reaction to the 
German “economic miracle” (Wirtschaftswunder) rather than to crises.53 
The Accounting Directives Act of 1985 transformed European Directives into German 
commercial law.54 The European Directives were an important first step towards European 
harmonization, which was only recently intensified by the IAS/IFRS-Regulation, requiring 
capital market-oriented corporations to prepare their group accounts in conformity with 
 
 52. See Herbert Brönner, Geschichte der Revision, in HANDWÖRTERBUCH DER REVISION 
663-70 (Adolf G. Coenenberg & Klaus v. Wysocki eds., 2d ed. 1992); Jens Wüstemann supra 
note 9;  Norbert Pfitzer & Christian Orth, Die Berichterstattung des Abschlussprüfers Nach 
Neuem Recht, in REFORM DES AKTIENRECHTS, DER RECHNUNGSLEGUNG UND DER PRÜFUNG 
873-97 (Dietrich Dörner et al. eds., 2d ed. 2003). 
 53.  See Herbert Brönner, Geschichte der Revision, in HANDWÖRTERBUCH DER REVISION 
663, 668-670 (Adolf G. Coenenberg & Klaus v. Wysocki eds., 2d ed. 1992). 
 54.  See Herbert Brönner, Geschichte der Revision, in HANDWÖRTERBUCH DER REVISION 
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International Accounting Standards/International Financial Reporting Standards. 
Amendments to audit regulation from 1998 until today were made under the impression of 
recent audit failures in Germany.  
After an overview of the development of the statutory audit (Table A), the tables 
concentrate on important stages in the development of internal reporting duties of the auditor 
(Table C) and external reporting to the public (Table D). Table B compresses information on 
some issues of auditor’s independence and the regulation of the audit profession. 
Table A. Statutory Audit55 
 
Companies Reform Act (Novelle des Aktiengesetzes vom 11. Juni 1870). 1870 
The supervisory board has to examine the balance sheet, the income statement, and 
the profit distribution proposition. 
Regulation Concerning Corporation Law (Verordnung des Reichspräsidenten über 
Aktienrecht, Bankenaufsicht und über eine Steueramnestie vom 19. 9. 1931, RGBl. 
I 1931, S. 493). 
1931 
 
First statutory audit requirement for corporations. (§ 262a HGB 1931). 
Accounting Directives Act (BiRiLiG, BGBl. I 1985, S. 2355). 1985 
Statutory audit for large and medium sized corporations. (§ 316 HGB 1985). 
Corporate Control and Transparency Act (KonTraG, BGBl. I 1998, S. 786). 1998 
 Auditors have to evaluate the appropriateness of a corporation’s risk reporting. (§ 
317 HGB 1998). 
Forth Financial Markets Reform Act of 2002 (ViertesFinMarktFöG, BGBl. I 2002, 
S. 2316). 
2002 
Evaluation of the system of internal controls of capital market-oriented 
corporations. (§ 317 HGB 2002). 
 
 
663, 670 (Adolf G. Coenenberg & Klaus v. Wysocki eds., 2d ed. 1992). 
 55. The translation of Tables A to D are to a certain extent borrowed from JEREMYN 
BROOKS & MERTIN DIETZ, DEUTSCHES BILANZRECHTS, GERMAN ACCOUNTING LEGISLATION 
(2d ed. 1993). 
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Table B. Regulation of the Audit Profession and Auditor’s Independence 
 
Regulation Concerning Corporation Law (Verordnung des Reichspräsidenten über 
Aktienrecht, Bankenaufsicht und über eine Steueramnestie vom 19. 9. 1931, RGBl. 
I 1931, S. 493). 
1931 
 
Only certified public accountants may audit large corporations. 
Corporate Control and Transparency Act (KonTraG, BGBl. I 1998, S. 786). 1998 
Reduction of overall charges from a single client to 30%. (§ 319 HGB 1998). 
Supervisory board assigns the auditor. (§ 318 HGB 1998). 
Audit partner has to rotate internally (within the audit firm) at least after 6 years of 
signing the audit opinion. (§ 319 HGB 1998). 
Increase of auditor’s legal liability in case of capital market-oriented corporations 
to 8 millions DM (4 million EUR). (§ 323 HGB 1998). 
Auditor Regulation Reform Act (WPO-Novelle, BGBl. I 2001, S. 1769) 2000 
Introduction of a review system (“peer review”), corresponding to the former US-
style. (§§ 57a-h WPO). 
Draft of the Accounting Legislation Reform Act (BilReG-Referentenentwurf) 2003 
The auditor of a company is forbidden to perform certain consulting activities for 
the same company (internal control, management and financial services, valuation 
services). (§ 319 HGB-E 2003). 
The auditor of a listed company is also not allowed to perform special tax services 
and appear for the company in court. (§ 319a HGB-E 2003). 
Reduction of overall charges from a single listed client to 15% (§ 319a HGB-E 
2003). 
 
 
 
Table C. Internal Reporting Duties: Auditor’s Report 
 
1931 
 
Regulation Concerning Corporation Law (Verordnung des Reichspräsidenten über 
Aktienrecht, Bankenaufsicht und über eine Steueramnestie vom 19. September 
1931, RGBl. I 1931, S. 493). 
 
The auditor must document in writing the results of his examination. The report 
must state whether the accounting documents comply with legal regulations and 
whether the legal representatives have supplied the information and explanations 
required. (§ 262e HGB 1931/§ 139 AktG 1937), 
1954 Decision of the Federal Supreme Court of Justice (BGH-Urteil v. 15.12.1954 II ZR 
322/53, BGHZ 1955, p. 17). 
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 The auditor shall inform management and supervisory board about facts which 
endanger the existence of the enterprise being audited or which could materially 
hinder its development. 
Reform of the Companies Act (AktG, BGBl. I 1965, S. 1089). 1965 
 The items included in the financial statements must be analyzed and adequately 
commented upon. (§ 166 AktG 1965). 
If, during his work, the auditor becomes aware of facts which endanger the 
existence of the enterprise or which could materially hinder its development or 
which indicate serious violations by the legal representatives against the law, the 
articles of association or the by-laws, then he must report on it. (§ 166 AktG 1965, 
based on the above decision). 
Accounting Directives Act (BiRiLiG, BGBl. I 1985, S. 2355). 1985 
Focusing on improved reporting to administrative and supervisory board. 
Negative variances compared with the prior year in the net worth, financial position 
and results and losses (the so-called true and fair view) which are material to the net 
income of the year must be included and adequately explained. (§ 321 HGB 1985). 
1998 Corporate Control and Transparency Act (KonTraG, BGBl. I 1998, S. 786). 
 
Focusing on problem-oriented reporting, the Act specifies the structure and the 
contents of the auditor’s report. 
In the first part of the report, the legal representatives have to comment on the 
present situation of the corporation. A special judgment has to be given about the 
continuity and the prospective development, considering the statements given in the 
management report (Lagebericht). (§ 321 HGB 1998). 
The main part is dedicated to assure that all regulations concerning the preparation 
of the financial statements have been followed. The auditor has to judge if the 
financial statements present a factually accurate picture of the corporation’s net 
assets, financing, and results of operations according to generally accepted 
accounting principles. The entries in the annual financial statements shall be 
classified and adequately discussed to give a true and fair view of the corporation’s 
situation beyond the information given in the notes. (§ 321 HGB 1998). 
Among other things, the report informs about the extent and the manner of the audit 
and determines potentially necessary actions to improve the internal monitoring 
system (applicable to officially quoted corporations only). (§ 321 HGB 1998). 
2002 Transparency Act (TransPuG, BGBl. I 2002, S. 2681). 
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 Focusing on problem-oriented reporting, the Act also specifies additional contents 
of the auditor’s report. 
In the main part the auditor’s report informs about material assumptions concerning 
the valuation of assets and liabilities. The auditor shall evaluate how accounting 
and valuation choices affect the financial position. (§ 321 HGB 2002). 
Objections which do not lead to disclaim the audit opinion shall be explained if it is 
relevant for monitoring the management. (§ 321 HGB 2002). 
Determination of potentially necessary actions to improve the internal monitoring 
system shall be made for all listed corporations. (§ 321 HGB 2002). 
The auditor has an oral reporting duty to inform about the main results of his audit 
in the course of the negotiation about the balance-sheet of the supervisory board. 
(§ 171 AktG 2002). 
Draft of the Accounting Legislation Reform Act (BilReG-Referentenentwurf)  2003 
The written long-form report of the auditor to the supervisory board may be 
disclosed to the public in the case of an insolvency. (§ 321a HGB-E 2003) 
 
 
Table D. External Reporting Duties: Audit Opinion 
 
Reform of the Companies Act (Novelle des Aktiengesetzes vom 11. Juni 1870). 1870 
 Supervisory board has to report the results of its examination to the annual general 
meeting.  
Regulation Concerning Corporation Law (Verordnung des Reichspräsidenten über 
Aktienrecht, Bankenaufsicht und über eine Steueramnestie vom 19. September 
1931, RGBl. I 1931, S. 493). 
1931 
If no objections are found upon completion of the examination, the audit opinion 
must show that bookkeeping, the annual financial statements, and the management 
report are in accordance with professional standards and comply with legal rules. 
(§ 262f HGB 1931). 
Reform of the Companies Act (AktG, BGBl. I 1965, S. 1089). 1965  
Static formulation of audit opinion, defined by law, if no objections have been 
found upon completion of the examination: “The accounting, the annual financial 
statements, and the management report which I (we) have audited in accordance 
with professional standards comply with the German Law and the company’s 
statutes.” (§ 167 AktG 1965). 
1985 Accounting Directives Act (BiRiLiG, BGBl. I 1985, S. 2355). 
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 Static formulation of audit opinion, defined by law, if no objections have been 
found upon completion of the examination: “The (consolidated) financial 
statements present in compliance with generally accepted accounting principles a 
true and fair view of the net worth, financial position, and results of the 
corporation.” (§ 322 HGB 1985). 
The audit opinion must be modified in appropriate fashion if additional comments 
appear necessary in order to avoid a wrong impression concerning the nature of the 
audit and the scope of the opinion. Compliance with the articles of association and 
the by-laws must be referred to if they contain permissible, additional regulations 
relating to the financial statements or the consolidated financial statements. (§ 322 
HGB 1985). 
If there are objections, the auditor must qualify or disclaim his opinion. The 
disclaimer must be explained in an opinion on the financial statements or the 
consolidated financial statements. The reason for qualification and disclaimer must 
be explained. Qualifications must be expressed clearly. (§ 322 HGB 1985). 
Corporate Control and Transparency Act (KonTraG, BGBl. I 1998, S. 786). 1998 
Dropping of boilerplate formulation. If no objections are found, the auditor states 
this in his audit opinion and judges that based on the information he got during the 
audit the (consolidated) financial statements give a true and fair view of the 
company. (§ 322 HGB 1998). 
Explanations concerning the judgment of the audit results shall be comprehensible 
and problem-oriented. (§ 322 HGB 1998). 
Risks which endanger the going-concern of the company have to be specified 
seperately. (§ 322 HGB 1998). 
The auditor has to suggest if the management report 
(Lagebericht/Konzernlagebericht) imparts a correct idea about the situation of the 
company. Additionally, he has to suggest if future risks are presented correctly. 
(§ 322 HGB 1998). 
Draft of the Accounting Legislation Reform Act (Referentenentwurf des BilReG) 2003 
The auditor’s opinion may be disclaimed if the auditor is not able to give a 
judgment. (§ 322 HGB-E 2003). 
A qualified opinion may only be given when the financial statements together with 
the explanation of the auditor give a true and fair view of the company. (§ 322 
HGB-E 2003). 
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